End-to-end, key-in-the-fragment
A room with nothing worth tapping.
The key to this conversation lives after the # in your address bar.
Browsers never send that part of a URL to a server, so the relay that carries
your messages has never held the means to read one. It stores a hash, a blob
of random-looking bytes, and a time to delete them.
Get the Android app
Point your camera at the code, or download it here. Android will ask you to allow installing from outside the store.
It is the stronger of the two: the page lives inside the signed APK instead of arriving from a server each time, the certificate is pinned, the WebView is barred from the network entirely, screenshots are blocked, and it routes through Tor if Orbot is running.
— · SHA-256 —
Hand this link to one person
Anyone holding it can read the room, so pass it through something you already trust — in person, or a channel you'd trust with the message itself.
What this does protect
- The relay can't read you. AES-256-GCM, key derived in your browser from the link fragment. The server receives ciphertext and a one-way hash of the key.
- No account, no cookie, no profile. Nothing to subpoena, nothing to leak, nothing to log in to.
- Tampering shows. GCM authenticates every message; an altered byte renders as a broken-seal slip, not as text.
- Messages expire. Each slip carries its own delete time and is swept server-side; Burn wipes the room immediately.
- No third party on the page. No webfont, no CDN, no analytics — one HTML, one CSS, one JS, all from this origin, locked down by CSP.
What it does not
- Metadata still exists. Your network and the host see that you reached this site, when, and roughly how much. Content is sealed; the fact of traffic is not. Use Tor or a VPN if that matters.
- Your device is the weak point. A screenshot, a shoulder, a keylogger or a backed-up browser history beats any cipher.
- The link is the secret. Whoever gets it — including whoever reads it over your shoulder in a chat app — gets everything in the room.
- No identity. Anyone in the room can type any name. The safety words only prove you share a key, not who's holding it.
- On the web, you trust the code you were served. A compromised host could ship a page that leaks the key. Check the fingerprint below against another device — or use the Android app, which carries its own copy and pins the certificate, so neither the host nor a CA can swap it.
- No forward secrecy yet. One key covers the room's whole life; if the link leaks later, anything still unexpired is readable.
So: not 100% untappable — nothing is, and anything that claims to be is selling you something.
What it is, is a channel where the operator of the server has no technical path to the contents,
and the remaining risks are yours to manage rather than theirs to abuse.
Code fingerprint of this page: measuring…
Kept on this device only. It travels inside the encryption, and it proves nothing.
Applies to what you send from now on. The relay deletes on expiry, on every read.
measuring…
Same on every device = you were all served the same code.
—
Metadata, your own device and whoever holds the link are all outside what a cipher can reach.
Sealed and empty.
Send the first slip, or hand someone the invite link.